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The Role of Background Beliefs 
The background belief challenge to PTA is that, whereas CP in­
volves an epistemically important position for background beliefs, 
PP does not, and therefore PTA is false. I have two goals for this 
chapter. The first is to explore the role of background beliefs in PP 
and CP and, by doing so, to defend the background belief chal­
lenge. Second, I consider two possible rejoinders Alston might 
make to the challenge and argue that neither is successful. 
I. Alston on Background Beliefs in Perceptual 
Practice 
Is the working assumption of the last section in Chapter 2 cor­
rect; do PP and CP differ on whether background beliefs enter into 
the generation and justification of beliefs? It would be neat and tidy 
if one could simply say that CP does involve background beliefs 
whereas PP does not. But philosophy is rarely neat and tidy. 
In Perceiving God, Alston's central thesis is that "putative direct 
awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of be­
liefs about God. " 1  One might thus surmise that Alston defends a 
parity thesis in this work. He does not, however, but not for the 
1. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 9. 
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kinds of reasons I have been suggesting. Alston argues there that 
background beliefs sometimes enter into sense perceptual belief 
formation, and that they do in several different ways. The same is 
true, he says, for CP (or, as he names it there, mystical percep­
tion). He suggests that one belief can be partly mediately based and 
partly immediately based. He raises the question whether any be­
lief is ever strictly immediately based, that is, justified on the basis 
of experience alone. His reply is affirmative, but he does recognize 
that sometimes, at least, background beliefs also have a function. 
He considers three different kinds of beliefs that might play a role 
and suggests several ways their functions differ from one another. 
Overall, however, he wants to suggest that, although background 
beliefs may play a role, it happens far less frequently than is some­
times thought and, most important for the thesis that one can per­
ceive God, background beliefs need not have a place at all. If Al­
ston is right, then as far as PTA is concerned the background belief 
challenge fails. But I believe the challenge does not fail, so I also 
believe that Alston is not right about the significance of back­
ground beliefs in CP and PP. 
I noted above that Alston does not defend a parity thesis in Per­
ceiving God. He does not do so, for he now thinks that PP and CP 
differ because CP runs into problems with religious plurality (as 
well as a lesser problem with checking procedures). I return to 
Alston's discussion of these in Chapter 8. Our immediate concern 
is background beliefs. Nevertheless, if it turns out that Alston is 
wrong about the function of background beliefs in CP, that is, if it 
turns out that there is a special role for background beliefs in CP 
which is absent in PP, then he has one more reason to reject a 
parity thesis between PP and CP. 
Is there, then, a special role for background beliefs in CP? To 
answer this question, we need to consider Alston's position on 
background beliefs in PP. He quickly deals first with what he calls 
"perceptual cues. " Psychology teaches us that several factors are 
involved in the way things appear to us. It is not implausible to 
suppose that our psyches take certain cues into account in the for­
mation of perceptual beliefs. But it is equally obvious that most of 
us are completely, or almost completely, unaware of taking such 
factors into account. Still, it is sometimes suggested that, for 
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example, "perceptual beliefs Gudgments) of distance are based on 
cognitions of factors of the sort just mentioned. "2 
How do beliefs about these cues function in the formation and 
justification of perceptual beliefs? There are three positions taken 
on this. One is that an inference (albeit unconscious) takes place. A 
second suggests that the workings are completely causal and not 
doxastic. The third falls in between, with the suggestion that there 
is a kind of "subdoxastic" taking account of the cues. Alston sim­
ply notes, and rightly so I think, that if there are beliefs involved in 
such cases they are involved in "a maximally hidden way. " It is, 
therefore, difficult to find sufficient reasons to suppose that such 
background information is epistemically important. 
Alston's second suggestion deals with what he calls "adequacy 
assumptions. " His concern is the attribution of nonsimple sensory 
predicates to external objects. We make such attributions on the 
basis of sense experience, and when we do we are assuming that a 
certain pattern of sensory qualities (difficult to describe in detail) is 
a reliable indicator of the predicate's applicability. Alston calls such 
assumptions "adequacy assumptions (or beliefs). " He writes: 
When I take it that X is a house, or your house, or a chair, or the 
chair we just bought, or a copy of Process and Reality, or a wave, or 
Coit Tower, or my wife, or a primrose, I am, in effect, supposing 
that the particular pattern of sensory qualia X is presenting to me at 
that moment is, at least in those circumstances, a reliable indication 
ofX's being a house, or your house, or a chair. That being the case, 
am I not basing my belief not just on the sensory appearance of X 
but also on my belief that a sensory appearance of that sort is a 
reliable indication that what is appearing is a house ... ? Isn't every 
case of nonsimple sensory-predicate attribution subject to evalua­
tion, at least in part, in terms of mediate justification?' 
Furthermore, although our paradigm case of a belief being based 
on another is the conscious inference, we must, says Alston, recog­
nize other cases in which no conscious inference is involved. For 
example, one's belief that Frank is out of town might be based on 
one's being told that he is, even though one never infers the former 
2. Ibid., p. 83. 
J. Ibid., p. 84. 
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from the latter. Given this broader understanding of the "based 
on" relationship, could it be that all our attributions of nonsimple 
sensory predicates rely, although not consciously so, on adequacy 
assumptions? Even if there are unconscious bases for beliefs, says 
Alston, the following two observations still carry a strong negative 
presumption against adequacy assumptions being part of the basis. 
The first is that perceivers are typically not aware of adequacy as­
sumptions being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs. The second 
is that in many cases they are not the sorts of things to which one 
has access. 
The stronger case against adequacy assumptions being part of 
the basis is that there is a level confusion lurking in the neighbor­
hood. To be justified in an attribution of nonsimple sensory predi­
cates one need not be justified in believing the adequacy assump­
tions that support the predication. The assumption need only be 
true. 4 It is simply not true that "what it takes for a condition, C, to 
be sufficient for P (call this 'what it takes' 'A') must itself be part of 
any sufficient condition for P. The fallacy is immediately evident 
once we see that if A is satisfied, then, by the very terms of the 
example, C is sufficient for P by itself, and A need not be added to 
it to get sufficiency. "5 Alston's point is not that adequacy beliefs 
never play a role in the justification of perceptual beliefs but simply 
that they ne�d not do so. 
The third kind of belief that can be relevant in perceptual belief 
formation Alston calls "contextual beliefs. " There are three types 
of contextual beliefs: beliefs about the setting, beliefs about posi­
tion, and beliefs about normality. The first of these deals with spa­
tiotemporal issues. Many houses look alike, and my knowing I am 
on Elm Street, rather than some other, may be a factor in my 
identifying the house that is the object of my experience. Beliefs 
about position are concerned with angle of view, distance from the 
observer, and state of the medium. Finally, Alston explains beliefs 
about normality by example. Suppose that I thought people, trees, 
dogs, and tables were constantly annihilated but replaced with ex­
act replicas. This would lead me to form somewhat different be-
4· There is much to be said about and for Alston's concern with level confu­
sions. I return to this theme in the next chapter. 
5· Alston, Perceiving God, p. 86. 
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liefs on the basis of the sensory array that meets me each day. Do I 
thus have, contrary to the supposition, an assumption about the 
relative constancy and permanence of physical substances as part of 
the basis for my normal perceptual beliefs? Such an assumption 
Alston calls a "normality assumption. " 
In the position and normality cases, says Alston, we are not 
aware of background beliefs, if we have them, at least in the ma­
jority of cases. And if such beliefs do play a role it is not required 
that they be part of the basis but only that they be true, just as with 
adequacy assumptions. But Alston admits that the case for situa­
tional beliefs being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs is stron­
ger. In many cases one's location does seem important. For exam­
ple, in identifying the large body of water to the west as the Pacific 
Ocean, one's being in California seems to be significant. But Al­
ston thinks this is not the normal case. "Even if just after forming 
the belief ["Those buildings are the World Trade Center"], I reflect 
that if I hadn't known I was in New York City I wouldn't have 
judged those buildings to be the World Trade Center, it doesn't 
follow that being in New York City was part of my basis for the 
belief. "6 Other options are possible, including that the reflection in 
question calls attention to what would be required for the ade­
quacy of the basis, rather than its being part of the basis itself. So, 
although situational beliefs may sometimes have a part in the justi­
fication of other beliefs, they need not do so in every case. 
But the situation is different with contextual beliefs than with 
adequacy beliefs: 
Here the adequacy assumption is not that the sensory pattern, A, is 
generally indicative of the presence of a 0. It is rather that, given an 
underlying supposition that A is an adequate basis for an attribution 
of 0 only in certain circumstances rather than others, the belief in 
question is that the present circumstances are of the former sort. 
That gives the belief a greater claim to be considered part of the 
basis, for it does indicate something distinctive about this situation 
rather than just amounting to a blanket approval of the phenomenal­
objective connection. But, by the same token, it offers us a different 
kind of alternative to holding that it must form part of the basis. 
Remember the point that the justification of perceptual beliefs is al-
6. Ibid., p. 90. 
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ways prima facie, subject to being overridden by sufficient indica­
tions to the contrary. This gives us another way in which a belief 
can be relevant to the justification of another belief. It can be nega­
tively relevant by constituting an (actual or possible) overrider or by 
ruling out such. 7 
Thus the suspicion that such background beliefs are relevant to the 
justification of other beliefs is explicable not in terms of their being 
required as part of the basis itself but as actually or possibly over­
riding the basis or by ruling out overriders. 
Alston takes himself to have dealt with both the subject and 
predicate components of perceptual beliefs: "In both cases we have 
argued that the justification might be either purely immediate or 
partly mediate. As for the former, we have suggested that I might 
both be able to justifiably take the perceived object to be your 
house and be able to justifiably believe of it that it is shingled, just 
on the basis of the way it looks. In both cases background beliefs 
would normally be playing some role, even if they are not part of 
the basis. " Alston goes on to suggest that there may be concern 
that object identification poses greater difficulty for immediate jus­
tification than does property attribution. He believes, however, 
that this concern is unfounded. Object identifications do not pose 
greater difficulty, since one can think of object identification in 
terms of identifying the subject as one that bears certain properties. 
Furthermore, any property that can figure in subject identification 
can also figure as a predicate. "Instead of forming the belief that 
your house needs painting, I could form the belief that that is your 
house, or that that building that needs painting is your house. "8 
There may, however, be a difference in degree in the possibility 
of purely immediate justification for subject and predicate attribu­
tion. "An indefinitely large plurality of unique individuals is out 
there to be recognized, whereas there are comparatively few prop­
erties we have any real need to distinguish. Hence it is more feasi­
ble for us to store relatively fixed ways of recognizing properties 
by their appearance than to build up comparably direct ways of 
recognizing individuals. "9 This, Alston claims, suggests that in rec-
7· Ibid. 
8. Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
9. Ibid., p. 92. 
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ognizing individuals we usually store up ways of perceptually rec­
ognizing distinguishing properties of them and then use what we 
have stored to recognize the individuals. We typically do not do 
this in cases of property recognition. He says, however, that this is 
only a difference of degree. We can and do, he continues, identify 
individuals directly from their sensory appearance and sometimes 
do recognize properties on the basis of others. 
Finally, there is a way in which beliefs attributing certain proper­
ties to a perceived object can play a role in the generation and justi­
fication of an identificatory belief but not be part of the basis of it. 
The belief that so-and-so is round-faced and slightly bent over may 
have as its basis a certain look, and that look may be sufficient not 
only for the property attribution but also for the subject identifica­
tion. In fact, the look by which one identifies so-and-so may be 
sufficient for the subject identification only because it is also suffi­
cient for the attribution of the property. But one need not have 
made the attribution in order to have made the identification. 
Thus, concludes Alston, although background beliefs can and 
sometimes do function in the justification of PP-delivered beliefs, 
they need not do so. Furthermore, it happens less frequently then 
is sometimes thought. When it does happen, background beliefs 
typically function not as part of the basis itself but in such a way 
that their truth is either required for the adequacy of the justifica­
tion or is negatively relevant, that is, as potential or actual over­
riders. 
2. Christian Practice and Background Beliefs 
Alston goes on to suggest that many of the roles background 
beliefs play in PP are alive in CP as well. Still, says Alston, it is 
important to be clear that, even though background beliefs are 
sometimes relevant in the justification of perceptually generated 
theistic beliefs, it remains possible that God appears to one as being 
0 and, if he does, and that is the whole story, one is immediately 
justified in the belief that God is 0. This point is essential for his 
thesis in Perceiving God-that direct awareness of God can provide 
justification for beliefs about God. 
Beyond this, however, beliefs generated by CP may be partly 
mediately justified. Just as with PP, adequacy beliefs may be oper-
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ating. In fact, in many accounts of mystical belief formation (that 
Alston cites), the predicates applied to God in perceptually gener­
ated beliefs go beyond what is explicitly given in the experience. 10 
Although positional and situational considerations have limited sig­
nificance in CP, since God is not spatially located, normality as­
sumptions can come in. One might suspect that one's supposed 
experience of God is being artificially induced, or the work of the 
devil, or caused by a nervous imbalance. But, on the other hand, 
there are some consequences of theistic experience that can indicate 
that the belief formation is a normal one. Spiritual and moral 
fruits, for example, might show the justificatory efficacy of theistic 
experience. Alston also admits that theological or metaphysical 
background beliefs can have parts in belief formation and justifica­
tion. In none of these cases, however, as with PP and its back­
ground beliefs, do these background beliefs have to be part of the 
basis, even though they may play epistemically related roles of the 
kinds noted. 
So, to answer the question with which this chapter began-do 
CP and PP differ on the role of background beliefs?-Alston gives 
a definite negative reply. Both PP and CP may sometimes have 
background beliefs as part of their bases, but they nee� not do so. 
If Alston is correct, then, as far as the argument of the previous 
chapter goes, even if there are background beliefs involved in CP, 
they are not epistemically important as far as distinguishing the 
deliverances of CP and PP are concerned. Since in neither case do 
background beliefs need to form part of the epistemic basis of the 
beliefs generated, it seems one cannot suggest that the deliverances 
of CP differ from those of PP in terms of the strength of their 
justification because of their background beliefs. 
I find myself in disagreement with Alston on this point. Al­
though I think a great deal of what he says about the function of 
background beliefs is correct, I believe he overlooks some impor­
tant features of belief formations dealing with epistemically unique 
individuals. 
To deal with the suggestion that it is not possible to recognize 
directly something one experiences as God, Alston writes: 
10. Ibid., pp. 12-20. 
The Role of Background Beliefs 
We should not suppose that in order to succeed in perceptually rec­
ognizing an object of perception as X (i.e., become perceptually jus­
tified in believing, or perceptually know, that the object is X), it is 
necessary that the object appears to one as Ill, where Ill is a property 
uniquely possessed by X. To perceptually recognize your house, it 
is not necessary that the object even display features that are in fact 
only possessed by your house, much less features that only your 
house could possess. It is enough that the object present to my expe­
rience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I gen­
erally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of (are a reliable guide 
to) the object's being your house. And so it is here. For me to rec­
ognize what I am aware of (X) as God, all that is necessary is that X 
present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of their 
possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I 
typically find myself. It is, again, not required that these features 
attach only to God, still less that they be such that they can attach 
only to God. And it is a matter for detailed investigation what sorts 
of appearances satisfy that condition, just as in the case of sensorily 
perceived objects. 11 
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Alston takes these suggestions to reply to questions such as how 
could a nythin g  of which I am directly aware uniquely identify the 
creator of heaven and earth, an absolutely perfect being of infinite 
power and goodness. Such is the kind of question behind the back­
ground belief challenge to PTA. The challenge's reply is that one 
cannot directly experience X as being God, since there are no 
properties that are both unique to God and capable of being experi­
enced by us. The challenge's position explicitly denies the point 
Alston makes. Which is right? 
I believe the challenge is closer to the truth. We can get at the 
issue here by considering a phrase in Alston's own denial, just 
quoted. "It is enough," says Alston, "that the object present to my 
experience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I 
generally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of . . .  the object's 
being your house. " Or, in the case of God, "all that is necessary is 
that X present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of 
their possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I 
typically find myself." What are these situations? What are the fea­
tures that can be sufficiently indicative of the object in question? 
I I. Ibid.' pp. 96-97-
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And, furthermore, what connection is there between the situations 
and the features? 
Let us take PP first. Earlier I suggested that PP gives us both 
epistemically unique individual beliefs and classificatory beliefs. 
But the two are not unrelated. The very means by which we clas­
sify or categorize things-their properties-are also the means by 
which we identify them. Alston suggests that there need not be a 
unique feature attached to an object by which the object can be 
identified. But he does not, I believe, distinguish carefully enough 
between what we can call kind features and unique features. Sure, 
Suzie's house may share kind features with other houses; they 
might have the same floor plan, be the same color, and have the 
windows placed in the same locations. But the use of the word 
"same" here is not, obviously, intended to pick out features at the 
numerically same position. The houses share the features "having 
such-and-such floor plan," "being pink, " and "having windows in 
the living room, kitchen, and bedrooms. " But the houses them­
selves occupy different spatial locations. What distinguishes the 
houses in fact are not the kind features-features many houses 
might share-but the unique features which, I suggest, turn out to 
be made up of a group of features best understood as a collection 
of kind features located at a specific spatiotemporal point. Suzie's 
house does have a unique property: the property of "being a pink, 
shuttered, . . .  bungalow at Fourth and Main. " Thus, not only do 
kind features distinguish houses from trees, rocks, and elephants, 
as well as one kind of house from another, but those very same 
features, located at a spatiotemporal point, are what make this 
house the unique one it is. 
But Alston does not deny this. He only denies that it is necessary 
that the house display such a unique feature. Let us call the collection 
of kind features located at a spatiotemporal point the "collective 
feature. " Now the question is, does one experience the collective 
feature that distinguishes Suzie's house from all others? Alston sep­
arates the situation or location information from what is experi­
enced when perceiving Suzie's house. Perhaps this is right. Perhaps 
it is right because one cannot typically experience, on the basis of 
phenomena alone, being in New York or California. 12 But that 
12. It may be possible to get this kind of belief out of experience alone. P erhaps 
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suggests that this information at best functions in the form of 
background beliefs; it is information brought to the experience and 
not given in it. But then Alston can admit this and say the role this 
information plays is that of the potential or actual overrider rather 
than part of the basis for the belief. 
I believe, however, that it is a mistake to separate the situational 
information from the other features of the experience. It seems to 
me that the location information is not part of the belief system 
I have when I form the belief (on perception alone) that this is 
Suzie's house. Rather, it is part of the conceptual scheme I bring to 
the experience. I objectify the experience as Suzie's house-the 
pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main. At least this is true 
for what we might call "local situation information," that is, spatial 
information that picks out where I am vis-a-vis the local geogra­
phy (this neighborhood or that street) rather than the larger geog­
raphy (such as New York City or California). That I am located in 
New York or California does seem to be part of my belief system, 
and when the generation of one of my beliefs requires that sort of 
information then clearly the belief generated is at least partly medi­
ate. But that I am in one neighborhood rather than another, on one 
street rather than another, is given directly in experience and thus 
the identification of Suzie's house is read off the experience rather 
than into it via background beliefs. In the local cases no belief 
about neighborhoods in required, since that information is built 
into the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience. 
Thus, as far as object identification within PP is concerned, PP 
can be a conceptual reading practice and Alston is correct. Al­
though background beliefs do sometimes play a role in the genera­
tion of physical object beliefs, they need not do so. He is incorrect, 
however, in his claim that for one perceptually to recognize an 
epistemically unique object the object need not display a unique 
feature. It is not enough for the object to display features that, in 
the perceptually given situation in which I find myself, are suffi-
one sees a building or set of buildings, or certain geographic features that are 
unique to a certain city. But this would be the exception to the rule. You have to 
be in special, well-known geographic locations for this to happen-in Anaheim 
outside Disneyland, by the Hollywood sign, or at the Statue of Liberty, and the 
like. Being somewhere in a small C alifornia town or on a street in Brooklyn will 
not do it. 
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ciently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take it to 
be. The "perceptually given situation in which I find myself' is 
always a spatiotemporally unique one, and the features I perceive 
are sufficiently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take 
it to be only because I am in that spatiotemporally unique situa­
tion. But being in the location is not enough; that location must 
also be part of what is given in experience. The feature the object 
needs to display and, in fact, that only it can display, is the collec­
tive feature made up of certain kind features at a certain (local) 
spatiotemporal location. We objectify our experience in exactly 
these terms. PP is a conceptual-reading practice. 
CP, in contrast, is arguably not a conceptual-reading practice. 
There is no spatiotemporally unique situation in which the believer 
finds herself as she experiences God. Nor, as has been argued, is 
there any feature of God that one can experience which could not 
also appear attached to other beings. Alston says that all that is 
necessary for one to recognize X as God is that X present to one 
features that are in fact a reliable indication of X's being God, at 
least in situations of the sort in which I typically find myself. But 
what might such features be that could not be duplicated by other 
supernatural beings? With PP, the spatiotemporal information al­
lows for the possibility of a check against duplicability. With God, 
no such check exists, so the mere appearance of godlike features 
always leaves one with doubts, or at least with possible grounds 
for doubt, as to the identity of the object of the experience. PP 
takes care of those doubts with spatiotemporal information given 
in the experience. 
Here we return to the difference between CP and PP noted ear­
lier. With PP one can generate both classificatory beliefs (beliefs 
that result from sorting among kinds of things; see Chapter 2, Sec­
tion 6) and epistemically unique individual beliefs. With CP no 
classificatory beliefs are generated within the practice. One need 
not sort out the focus of the practice from other things, since there 
is only one kind of thing with which the practice is concerned and 
only one member of the kind, God. One need not sort out God 
from among other things or kinds of things, since the practice has 
no other focus than God. And it is built into the practice itself that 
any features attributable to the objects of belief generated by the 
practice are features only that object can have. But this raises the 
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issue of religious plurality and the host of other practices parallel to 
CP, such as Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and the like. What is 
to keep one of these other gods from appearing to me with the 
same properties of the Christian god? There is no spatiotemporal 
grid that can help, and the background belief challenge seems to 
stand. There need to be unique properties that can be experienced, 
and there are none as far as God is concerned. 
To generate the belief that the object of my experience is God, 
that is, the god of Christianity rather than one of the others, I must 
bring background information to the experience. But this, unlike 
local situation information, is not something that is read off the 
experience; it is not part of my conceptual scheme. It is, instead, 
substantive information I use to read the experience. Is it part of 
the basis of my belief? This is a difficult question. Let us answer an 
easier question first. Need the information be part of a conscious 
inference? No, and this is where noninferential mediated practices 
come in. We might have an experience to which we bring both our 
conceptual scheme and our substantive beliefs and yet objectify our 
experience directly into language contained in the combination of 
the two. A noninferential mediated practice is just what its name 
suggest, noninferential even though the justification is mediated 
through beliefs and not just conceptual schemes. Are beliefs deliv­
ered by CP, therefore, partly immediately based and partly medi­
ately based? No, not if what is meant by the latter is that a con­
scious inference is involved. Are the beliefs part of the basis? No, 
not if what is meant is conscious inference; but yes, if what is 
meant is that, unless I hold the beliefs, the justification does not go 
through. And it will not do simply for the beliefs to be true. They 
must be part of my noetic framework. The reason is that the in­
formation in the beliefs is needed for the objectification to go 
through, and this is not just a matter of justification but of getting 
the belief itself generated. 
There is more to be said about the position of background be­
liefs in CP and their epistemic importance. Nevertheless, enough 
has been said to begin to evaluate my tentative suggestion that CP 
has a special place for background beliefs that PP fails to have and 
thus that PTA is not true. If I am right in the argument of this 
section, then CP and PP do differ on the function of background 
beliefs. And if this role is epistemically important, as I suggested in 
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Chapter 2, then PTA is not true. But there are some potential re­
sponses and rejoinders to the account as presented thus far, and we 
can consider them n ow. 
3. A Potential Response and Rejoinder 
Perhaps Alston could attempt to circumvent this challenge by 
suggesting that in fact one need not use background beliefs in the 
formation and justification of theistic beliefs. Instead he might sug­
gest an understanding of experience in which the needed interpre­
tive structures and concepts are part of the experie nce itself. Such 
an approach to mystical experiences is uncovered and discussed by 
J. William Forgie. 
After discussing several "hyper-Kantian" interpreters of mystical 
experience, Forgie writes: 
The picture these writers present seems so far a familiar one. For 
Kant, experience is a compound, a product of sensory intuitions. 
filtered, as it were, through a priori concepts . . .. But as we will see, 
this "rival " view is really [not just Kantian but) hyper-Kantian in at 
least two respects: 
(1) First, for Kant the a priori concepts, the categories, are twelve 
in number and are shared by all mankind. And they are inescapable. 
Human beings must experience the world in terms of cause and 
effect, and substance and attribute, if they are to experience it at all. 
. . . But the rival view extends an experience-shaping role to con­
cepts and beliefs which vary from one culture-more pertinently, 
one religious tradition-to another. Mystical or religious experi­
ences are partially determined or shaped by concepts and beliefs that 
are peculiar to the particular religious tradition of the one having the 
experience. Let us call these elements which shape experience, but 
are not categories, "category-analogues." 
(2) Second, experience for Kant is, very roughly speaking, essen­
tially judgemental; having experience is inseparable from making 
judgements about it. The categories "shape " experience by deter­
mining that those judgements will take certain forms. They do not 
contribute to the phenomenological content of the experiences they 
shape . . .. [However,] category-analogues shape experience by par­
tially determining its phenomenological content. 13 
13. J. William Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical 
Experience," Religious Studies 21 (1985): 205-18, quotation p. 208. 
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According to the hyper-Kantians, mystical experiences are a result 
of "category-analogues" and "experiential input" working together 
so that one cannot, legitimately, separate the two. The phenome­
nological content of an experience is a hybrid of category-ana­
logues and other sensory (or sensory like) input. Further, unlike 
Kant's understanding of experience, according to which all humans 
share the same categorical structure and hence have the same expe­
rience, mystical experiences are different from one another because 
our category-analogue structures are different. 
Forgie goes on to argue that, if the hyper-Kantian understanding 
of mystical experience is plausible, it carries with it "sceptical im­
plications about one sort of evidential value mystical experiences 
are sometimes thought to have. "14 He has in mind here the pre­
sumption of veridicality typically given to sensory experience and 
often extended to mystical experience, namely, that barring special 
circumstances, what one seems to experience is what one experi­
ences-that one's experiences are, barring special circumstances, 
accurate. 
Although this presumption of veridicality seems to be true for 
ordinary sensory experiences, it is not true for hyper-Kantian expe­
riences, whether sensory or mystical. Forgie suggests that the pre­
sumption of veridicality is not upset by the Kantian categories, but 
it is by the category-analogues. "Suppose I am in the presence of a 
supernatural being who acts on some appropriate 'faculty' of mine. 
During this encounter certain sensory or super-sensory input gets 
mixed with input from the category-analogues, with the result that 
I have an experience in which it appears that I am confronting a 
personal and loving being."15 Now, further suppose that the suffi­
cient cause of my experience of those characteristics is the cate­
gory-analogues. After ruling out certain potential confusions about 
what this picture entails, Forgie goes on to argue that the hyper­
Kantian explanation rules out the presumption of veridicality. 
At least that is what we would say in a sense perceptual case. 
Suppose one sees the arches in a cathedral as Gothic because of a 
category-analogue, when the arches are actually Romanesque. Be­
fore discovering the existence of the category-analogue, one would 
follow our usual rule suggested by the presumption of veridicality: 
14· Ibid., p. 205. 
IS. Ibid., p. 2I6. 
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what one sees is what is there to see. But once discovering the 
causal role of the category-analogues, the presumption of verid­
icality is no longer granted epistemic weight. In like manner, if we 
have an experience of a personal and loving being and the experi­
ence of the characteristics is caused by category-analogues and we 
know this, then the experience loses its presumption of verid­
icality-unless the category-analogues are epistemically justified. 
But how could they be? Our categories need no justification, at 
least not in a straightforwardly epistemic sense, since they are what 
make experience possible. Furthermore, the categories seem not to 
be the kind of thing that could be justified. Likewise, it seems, 
with category-analogues. With the latter, however, we do not 
need them for experience to be possible. So why trust them to give 
us veridical beliefs-unless the content of the category-analogues 
could be understood in some other way, perhaps as beliefs? But 
this is what Alston needs to avoid. 
If this argument is correct, the hyper-Kantian understanding of 
theistic experience removes any presumption in favor of the expe­
rience's veridicality. We can therefore conclude that, insofar as Al­
ston might attempt to use a hyper-Kantian approach to defend his 
objectification account of theistic experience, there is little if any 
presumption in favor of the veridicality of the resulting experience. 
Barring other special circumstances or conditions that make it rea­
sonable to take the experience as veridical, theistic beliefs formed 
via hyper-Kantian experience do not have the same epistemic sta­
tus as the deliverances of PP.16 Thus this potential rejoinder is not 
successful. 
4· A Second Response and Rejoinder 
A second rejoinder to the background belief challenge can be 
found in Alston's own work. Alston argues that 
r6. One might suggest that this is merely another version of what Alston al­
ready rules out, namely, that challenge that calls attention to the lack of universal 
objectification of experience. Although nearly everyone uses PP, not everyone uses 
CP . But a moment's thought shows that the hyper-Kantian challenge rests on 
different grounds, grounds accepted by all in the case ofPP . If we reject instances of 
the employment of PP because of hyper-Kantianism, we should surely reject in­
stances of CP because of hyper-Kantianism-unless there are special reasons not to. 
But it is difficult to see what those reasons might be in this case. 
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even if an individual's account of the phenomenology of his/her 
own experience is not infallible, it must certainly be taken seriously. 
Who is in a better position to determine whether S [the person pur­
porting to have theistic experiences] is having an experience as of 
something's presenting itself to S as 0 than S? Thus we would need 
strong reasons to override the subject's confident report of the char­
acter of her experience. And where could we find such reasons? I 
suspect that most people who put forward . .. alternative diagnoses 
do so because they have general philosophical reasons for supposing 
either that God does not exist or that no human being could per­
ceive Him, and they fail to recognize the difference between a phe­
nomenological account of object presentation, and the occurrence of 
veridical perception. In any event, once we get straight about all 
this, I can not see any reason for doubting the subjects' accounts of 
the character of their experiences, whatever reasons there may be for 
doubting that God Himself does in fact appear to them. 17 
I have been careful to distinguish between the question of verid­
icality and the question about the object of the experience. Further­
more, the point of my argument is to deny Alston's claim that 
there is no reason for doubting the subjects' accounts. On the phe­
nomenological level, I have suggested, one does have at least some 
reason to be suspicious of the subjects' characterization of their ex­
periences as being of God. 
My argument is based on an analysis of what can be given phe­
nomenologically in the experience. There is never a direct, concep­
tual-reading experience that is phenomenologically of God or any 
other epistemically unique person. Belief formations involving 
epistemically unique individuals always involve a role for back­
ground beliefs or for spatiotemporal information given in the ex­
perience. This is true whether the belief formation is inferential or 
not. But the only things we can experience as having the requisite 
kind of spatiotemporal location are physical objects, and those, for 
the most part, only of a certain class-those without intentionality 
and free will that gives them the ability to move around (i.e., any 
physical thing that is neither a human nor a nonhuman animal). 
Thus one cannot experience phenomenologically a uniquely instan­
tiable property or any property that is guaranteed phenome­
nologically to identify an epistemically unique individual where 
17. Alston, "Experience of God," p. 7-
[ 5 5  
56 ] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
that individual does not have what we can call "spatiotemporal 
rootedness." 
Alston claims that the subjects' accounts do exactly what I have 
argued they cannot do legitimately: 
If our cases are to conform to our account of perceptual conscious­
ness, they must (phenomenologically) involve God's appearing to 
their awareness as being and/or doing so-and-so. And so our sub­
jects do tell us. God is experienced as good, powerful, loving, com­
passionate, and as exhibiting "plentitude." He is experienced as 
speaking, forgiving, comforting, and strengthening. And yet how 
can these be ways in which God presents Himself to experience? 
Power and goodness are complex dispositional properties or bases 
thereof, dispositions to act in various ways in various situations. 
And to forgive or to strengthen someone is to carry out a certain 
intention. None of this can be read off the phenomenal surface of 
experience. This is quite different from something's presenting itself 
to one's sensory consciousness as red, round, sweet, loud, or pun­
gent. Isn't it rather that the subject is interpreting, or taking, what she 
is aware of as being good or powerful, as forgiving or strengthen­
ing? But then what is God experienced as being or doing?'" 
Alston considers this issue in his "Perception of God, "19 but he 
summarizes his argument briefly in the essay just quoted: 
The basic point is that we have different sorts of concepts for speci­
fying how something looks, sounds, tastes, or otherwise percep­
tually appears. There are phenomenal concepts that specify the phe­
nomenal qualia that objects present themselves as bearing-round, 
red, acrid, etc. But there are also comparative concepts that specify a 
mode of appearance in terms of the sort of objective thing, event, 
property or whatever, that typically (normally . .. ) appears in that 
way. In reporting sensory appearances we typically use comparative 
concepts whenever the appearance involves something more com­
plex than one or two basic phenomenal qualities. Thus we say, "She 
looks like Susie," "It tastes like a pineapple," "It sounds like Bach." 
There undoubtedly is in these cases some complex pattern of simple 
phenomenal qualia, but it is usually beyond our powers to analyze 
the appearance into its simple components. And so we are typically 
thrown back on the use of comparative concepts to report how 
18. Ibid. 
19. Alston, "The P erception of God," Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 23-52. 
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something looks, tastes. . . . And so it is in our religious cases. Our 
subjects were telling us God presented Himself to their experience as 
a good, powerful, compassionate, forgiving being could be ex­
pected to appear. And so in reporting modes of appearance in the 
way they do they are proceeding just as we do in reporting modes 
of sensory appearance.'" 
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One might attempt to use these claims in reply to the back­
ground belief challenge to PTA. One might say, for example, that 
one has a complex concept of God, and that phenomenologically 
describing what one perceives when engaging in CP does not in­
volve appeal to background information or beliefs but only to the 
concept. I believe, however, that Alston's suggestions cannot be 
used in response to the points of my analysis. Suppose that we 
grant Alston his distinction between phenomenal and comparative 
concepts and we further grant him the point that we use phenome­
nal concepts in cases of simple identifications and comparative con­
cepts in cases of complex identifications-those cases in which 
there is a need for specifying a "mode of appearance in terms of the 
sort of objective thing." But identifying a sort of thing-a house, 
car, person-is not the same as identifying an individual thing. In 
identifying Suzie's house, Tom versus Tim Tibbitts, and God, we 
are identifying what I have called epistemically unique individuals, 
not sorts. So, although we do make claims such as "It looks like 
Suzie's house" or "It looks like Tom," these kinds of appeals are 
not, I suggest, comparing one's present experience to concepts of 
other houses or people but to one's memory of an earlier (or imag­
ined) experience of the epistemically unique individual person or 
thing. 
But there are two kinds of case with which we need to concern 
ourselves: cases where the object involved is spatiotemporally 
rooted and cases where the object is not. In both cases memory is 
important, since we must be "introduced" to the object. In the case 
of spatiotemporally rooted objects, the introduction can be done 
simply by our experiencing, for the first time, the object qua the 
object-at-this-location (or by "experiencing" the object in our 
mind's eye as someone describes the object-at-such-and-such-loca­
tion). We then use the local situation information, now "locked 
20. Alston, "Experience of God," pp. 7-8. 
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into" our conceptual scheme, to form beliefs about the episte­
mically unique object when we reidentify it. Here memory func­
tions only in the sense that the spatiotemporal information be­
comes part of our conceptual scheme. 
In the other case, there is no information we can "lock in" that 
uniquely picks out, when taken together with the nonspatiotem­
poral features, the object in question. Thus there is always an ap­
peal, conscious or not, back to our initial introduction, whether 
the introduction is a literal one-say, by the human person we are 
meeting or by a mutual acquaintance-or some other kind of in­
troduction, such as when we meet an animal and give it a name or 
otherwise identify it. 21 But, in these cases, when we reidentify the 
person or animal we must appeal to background beliefs, since there 
is not sufficient information in our conceptual schemes. And the 
phenomenological information given in our reidentificatory expe­
riences is never enough to identify them, even when we do re­
member "what they look like." The possibility of mistaken iden­
tity is a live one, since any feature this person has is a feature she 
may share with someone else, at least as far as experience alone 
goes. 
Thus, in this second class of cases, to identify an epistemically 
unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, we must have 
background information of a substantial sort such as "Tim is out of 
town. " Unlike the concept of house or person-( comparative) sor­
tal concepts-which can be applied successfully in totally new situ­
ations, concepts of epistemically unique individuals cannot be. The 
phenomena themselves, even when the perceiver has a fully de­
veloped conceptual framework, cannot do it. To identify an epi­
stemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, in short, 
we must appeal to information other than mere concepts, even if 
they are comparative concepts. So there are three kinds of complex 
21. There is, perhaps, a kind of continuum involved with spatiotemporal root­
edness. A tree is more or less permanently fixed, a house likewise. But animals are 
not. Some of them, however, are caged, corraled, or otherwise fixed and thus have 
a somewhat stationary location. Other animals are not and are free to go where 
they please, barring physical obstacles. Humans, along with certain birds and sea 
creatures, are perhaps at the high end of this scale with the least fixed location, 
unless jailed, kept in zoos, or otherwise constrained. God, being nonspatial alto­
gether, is the paradigm case of an object that is not spatiotemporally rooted. 
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identifications, one in which comparative concepts are used to 
identify a sort of thing, one in which local spatiotemporal concepts 
(initially created in the perceiver in his or her first real or imagined 
experience of the object) are used to identify an epistemically 
unique but spatiotemporally rooted individual, and one in which 
beliefs are used to identify and reidentify an epistemically unique 
but spatiotemporally nonrooted individual. Alston does not distin­
guish among these three. 
Alston is right in calling attention to the distinction between 
simple and complex cases of perceptual identification, but this does 
nothing to explain how, in the cases of complex individual identi­
fication, we identify the object of the perception. Everything in 
my argument could be true even if Alston's basic distinction is a 
good one: totaling all the experienced qualia does not give us con­
clusive grounds for the individual identification, except in cases of 
spatiotemporally rooted individuals. 
If the arguments of this and the preceding chapter are correct, 
some questions about PP and CP still need to be answered, along 
with questions about Jnw· Is Alston's notion of Jnw finely tuned 
enough? Is there not a difference between a practice that supplies us 
with conceptual-reading beliefs and one that provides us with non­
inferential mediated beliefs? And does this difference not give us 
some cause for concern about whether CP, since it does appear to 
rely on background beliefs, is as epistemically secure as PP? Now, 
if this difference is a reason to question CP's epistemic strength as 
compared to PP's, then PTA fails. But at this stage all that is safe to 
conclude is that Jnw is too broad a category and therefore stands in 
need of further refinement. 
